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1. I am very much indebted to Professor Richard Wright for reviewing and commenting on this
piece. May he be warmly thanked for it.
2. See Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter ed. 2010),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/ (asking “whether and to what extent
causation in legal contexts differs from causation outside the law, for example in science or everyday
life . . . .”); see also FLORENCE G’SELL-MACREZ, RECHERCHES SUR LA NOTION DE CAUSALITÉ (2005)
(University of Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne).
3. Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 1 (Helen Beebee et al. eds., 2009).
4. Max Kistler, Analysing Causation in Light of Intuitions, Causal Statements, and Science, in
CAUSATION IN GRAMMATICAL STRUCTURES 79 (Bridget Copley & Fabienne Martin eds., 2015).
5. Id. at 82.
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Determining whether the law could and should have its own definition
of causation which would be based solely on its own logic and objectives
and would stay independent of philosophical or scientific accounts is a
nagging question. 2 Whatever the answer may be, one must admit that law
and philosophy share the same difficulty in defining causation. This difficulty is so acute that, in both disciplines, “anyone familiar with the causation debate as it has been conducted in recent years will be familiar with a
vast range of theories and counterexamples, which collectively can lead
one to suspect that no univocal analysis of the concept of causation is possible.” 3 Therefore, it seems appropriate in both contexts, while faced with
such a large number of approaches, to assess the various accounts of causation with a certain criteria of adequacy. 4
In this respect, philosophy and law have necessarily different standards. Certainly, it may be argued that philosophy should privilege, in assessing the various approaches of causation, the criteria of coherence,
agreement with common-sense intuition and compatibility with contemporary science. 5 However the law engages in types of inquiry that are based
on interrogations which may lead to favor other standards. It has been asserted that, while philosophers do not seem to agree on which underlying
interrogation their approaches refer to, “lawyers should explicitly choose
just one interrogation to underlie causal usage in law so that it is clear what
information we are reporting when we use causal language for legal pur-
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poses.” 6 Within this context, such an interrogation should be chosen “to
serve the wide projects of the law” which is mainly interested in “identify[ing] when a specified factor was ‘involved’ in the existence of a particular phenomenon.” 7
In any case, it is beyond dispute that law and philosophy have much in
common while addressing the notion of cause which is—in both disciplines—“a multiple-purpose tool.” 8 Yet certain functions of causation
emerge both in the legal and philosophical contexts. Above all, the notion
of cause serves to explain how a certain situation came about: in this respect, the function of causation is backward-looking and explanatory. 9
Another function is attributive: causation is used to fix the extent of responsibility of agents. The last function of the notion of cause that can be
identified is to predict what will happen from a forward-looking perspective. 10 While this last function is probably less prominent in the law, the
others are common to law and philosophy. This circumstance explains why
the various approaches of causation in the law appear to be, in many respects, the extension of philosophical developments.
The purpose of this contribution will thus be to present, very shortly
and modestly, the major approaches analyzing the notion of cause in contemporary philosophy before turning to the main legal theories of causation. Such an overview purports to bring to light the obvious links between
law and philosophy concerning causation thinking.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES OF CAUSATION

05/10/2016 13:13:34

6. Jane Stapleton, Causation in the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra
note 3, at 1224.
7. Id.
8. Honoré, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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The current leading theories of causation in the contemporary philosophical landscape may be roughly divided into three major conceptions.
The first one is based on the related but distinct ideas of regularity or instantiation of natural laws and is often presented as the deductive nomological (DN) conception of causation. The second one is counterfactual and
the third is a probabilistic conception of causal links. Whereas the first two
theories are based on the Humean-Millian account of causation, the third
one results from the development of probabilistic thinking in the recent
period.
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Before presenting successively those three approaches, it should be
stated at the outset that other recent but less debated theories exist and will
not be discussed here, such as the attempt to characterize causation in terms
of “continuous process and interaction between them” (causal process theories) 11 or the concept of manipulation (agency and interventionist theories). 12
A. The Regularity/Covering Law View of Causation 13

05/10/2016 13:13:34

11. Phil Dowe, Causal Process Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note
3, at 360–95.
12. James E. Woodward, Agency and Interventionist Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CAUSATION, supra note 3, at 396–440.
13. Stathis Psillos, Regularity Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note
3, at 230–75.
14. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 173–94 (2012) (ebook).
15. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE (CosmoClassic
2008) (1843); Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 40
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181, 1181–1267 (2003); Psillos, supra note 13, at 243–45.
16. Psillos, supra note 13, at 243–45.
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According to David Hume, causal judgments are based on the experience of regularities. He states, “We may define a cause to be an object
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling
the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those
objects that resemble the latter.” 14 In other words, events that are like the
cause are regularly followed by events like the effect.
From this perspective, regularity theories tend to define causation in
terms of subsumption under uniformly experienced regularities. This means
that singular causal judgments are not based on direct perception of powers
or forces but founded on the belief that a certain succession of events instantiates one (or more) experienced regularities.
John Stuart Mill converted Hume’s regularity account, which was
skeptical regarding the actual existence of causal laws, into an empiricist
covering law version of what is today called the nomological account of
causation. He argued that a cause is an antecedent set of conditions which
is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of the effect.15 Mill distinguished
the positive factors from the negative conditions, the absence of which is
necessary for the effect. To Mill, the cause is, philosophically speaking, the
sum total of the conditions positive and negative taken together.16 In other
words, a fully described causal law would list all the conditions that together are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a certain consequence.
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In modern philosophy, causal explanation has been assimilated to the
“deductive-nomological” (DN) conception of causation 17 presented by C.
Hempel and P. Oppenheim in their seminal article Studies in the Logic of
Explanation. 18 According to this approach, one event c is the cause of another event e, if and only if there is a law of nature that connects events like
c with events like e. Although it has been subject to much criticism since
the 1960s, the DN model remains one of the major approaches to the analysis of causation. 19
One of the major difficulties with regularity and covering law theories arises from the fact that regularities and empirically based causal laws
(better described as causal generalizations since they are almost never fully
described) are imperfect. 20 Causal conditions may not be invariably followed by their effects. For example, smoking is a cause of lung cancer but
some smokers do not develop lung cancer. On the contrary, as Mill recognized, a specific effect may result from various different sets of factors,
which is called the problem of “heterogeneity of circumstances” 21: lung
cancer may result from smoking, but also from a genetic susceptibility or
exposure to asbestos. Furthermore, contemporary science has shown that
causal laws are not invariable: the universe is not deterministic.
B. Counterfactual Theory

05/10/2016 13:13:34

17. James Woodward, Scientific Explanation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 2, at 1–2, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/scientific-explanation/.
18. Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explanation, J. PHIL. SCI. ASSOC.
135, 136–40 (1948); See Psillos, supra note 13, at 259–62.
19. Woodward, supra note 17, at 2.
20. Christopher Hitchcock, Probabilistic Causation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 1.1,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
21. Id.
22. Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
23. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 56 (Peter Millican ed.,
2007).
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The counterfactual approach is based on David Hume’s second remark
about causation. 22 Hume maintained that causation was based on the experience of regularities but he also added that a causal link was established
“where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.” 23
This second definition expressed a relationship of strict necessity between
two events: the first object or event had to be strictly necessary for the occurrence of the second, in the sense that the second could never occur in the
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24. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal and
Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 465 (2016).
25. However, it is possible to read this second definition as plainly restating the first one. See
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND
METAPHYSICS 399 (2009).
26. L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note
3, at 276.
27. The analysis of J.L. Mackie, which is developed in the Chapter 2 of his book, can also be
mentioned. See J.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 2958 (1974).
28. David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556 (1973).
29. Id. at 557.
30. Menzies, supra note 22, at 2.1.
31. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 111–12.
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absence of the first. 24 Although this counterfactual definition was very
different from the first definition, 25 Hume never explored this second perspective.
It was not until the late 1960s that sophisticated counterfactual approaches of causation were developed. 26 The best known and most thoroughly elaborated counterfactual theory of causation is David Lewis’s
theory, 27 exposed in his 1973 seminal article, Causation. 28 In Lewis’s theory, causal relations are analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence
between two actual events. The event e causally depends on the event c if
the counterfactual statement “if event c had not occurred, event e would not
have occurred” is true. In this perspective, a counterfactual conditional is a
conditional sentence, whose antecedent is contrary-to-fact. In Lewis’s
words, “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the
difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened
without it. Had it been absent, its effects — some of them, at least, and
usually all — would have been absent as well.” 29
In Lewis’s perspective, asserting that a counterfactual statement is true
implies to rely on similarity relations between possible worlds. “One world
is said to be closer to actuality than another if the first resembles the actual
world more than the second does.” 30 In this perspective, the counterfactual
“If Mr. Gourlain had not smoked he would not suffer from cancer” is true if
and only if some world where Mr. Gourlain does not smoke and is in good
shape is closer to the actual world than is any world where Mr. Gourlain
does not smoke and suffers from cancer. The possible world analysis relies
on causal laws to assess the necessity of a condition for the occurrence of
the effect.31 Although some proponents of the counterfactual approach, as
Lewis, explicitly rely on causal laws, others appear to reject any reasoning
based on causal laws or generalization and favor a singular causation approach that focuses on the most similar possible world in specific circum-
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32. Moore, supra note 15, at 1195.
33. L.A. Paul, Counterfactual Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note
3, at 276–77.
34. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 111–13. The distinction between strict, strong and weak
senses of necessity and sufficiency was established by Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,
73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1039 (1988).
35. See David Lewis, Causal Explanation, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS II 214–40 (1st ed. 1987).
36. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 72 (2d ed. 1985).
37. See id. at 33 (“The line between cause and mere condition is in fact drawn by common sense
on principles which vary in a subtle and complex way, both with the type of causal question at issue and
the circumstances in which causal questions arise.”).

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B

stances. 32 In any case, since counterfactual conditionals refer to particular
events at particular times, the counterfactual approach is considered as a
theory of singular instances of causation rather than of causal laws.33 Lewis agrees with Mill that the second event may occur in the absence of the
first, contrary to Hume’s apparent assumption. For a condition to be a
cause, it need not be always necessary for the occurrence of the effect
(strict necessity), but rather only necessary for the occurrence of the effect
in the specific singular instance (strong necessity). 34
In 1986, Lewis presented a probabilistic extension to his original
counterfactual theory of causation 35 in order to take into account the fact
that probabilistic processes are widespread in the actual world. In this view,
causal dependence can be expressed as follows: if Mr. Gourlain had not
smoked, his probability of developing lung cancer would have been much
less than its actual chance.
Nevertheless, defining causation in terms of causal dependence raises
various difficulties. First, if any event but for an effect would not have
occurred is a cause, the theory may generate some absurd results. For example, it is easy to assert that an injury would not have occurred if the victim or the tortfeasor were never born. This is why Herbert Hart and Tony
Honoré tried to develop a distinction between causes and background conditions which common sense, in their opinion, usually draws. According to
Hart and Honoré, common sense distinguishes spontaneously between
causes and “mere circumstances” 36: the torfeasor’s birth is a background
condition whereas the torfeasor’s act is a cause. Such a distinction is made
by referring to the context of the inquiry: for example, tort law raises questions of personal liability. The distinction also relies on the context of the
effect’s occurrence. 37 However, Lewis himself never made such a distinction.
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38. Paul, supra note 26, at 298–99.
39. Id. at 306–07.
40. Lewis, supra note 28, at 563.
41. Menzies, supra note 22, at ¶ 3.4.
42. David Lewis, Causation as Influence, 97 J. PHIL. 182 (2000).
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Second, the theory does not solve the issues created by causal overdetermination, that is preemptive causation 38 and duplicative causation. 39 In
cases of preemptive causation, the effect would have been produced even if
the actual cause had not occurred because another causal factor would have
occurred and produced it. For example, Mr. X died in a traffic accident but
he was already suffering from a fatal disease and would have died anyway,
thus it would be inaccurate to assert that Mr. X would not have died but for
the car accident. In duplicative causation cases, two events jointly caused
the effect but both of them would have caused it alone if the other event
had not occurred. For example, Mr. X was shot in the head by two bullets,
each of which was sufficient to kill him.
In order to deal with such cases, Lewis developed the notion of chains
of causal dependence. According to Lewis, event c causes event e if and
only if there is a chain of intermediate events c, c1, c2, . . ., e, so that each
event in the chain depends counterfactually on its predecessor. 40 By defining causation in terms of stepwise counterfactual dependence, Lewis is thus
able to distinguish the preempting actual cause (the car accident) from the
preempted potential cause (the fatal disease). There is a causal chain running from the car accident to the death, but no such chain running from the
disease to the death. Nevertheless, the reasoning in terms of chains of causal dependence cannot deal satisfactorily with certain preemption cases, like
cases of “late preemption” 41 where the effect resulted from the actual cause
before the preempted cause could produce anything. For example, Mr. X
was injured in a collision with A’s car, but Mr. X’s car would have later
collided with B’s car if the first collision with A’s car had not occurred. In
other words, the alternative process (collision with B) is cut short after the
main process (collision with A) has actually brought the effect. In such a
case, there is no causal dependence between the collision with A’s car and
the injury, because there would have been an accident due to collision with
B even if there was no collision with A.
In 2000, Lewis presented a last version of his theory that develops the
notion of “influence”. 42 Influence corresponds to “counterfactuals that are
sensitive to a wide range of characteristics, such that, had C not occurred
just as it actually did, E would not have occurred just as it actually did. The
final version of the view defended by Lewis is the thesis that, if whether,
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when, and how C occurs influences to a suitable degree whether, when, and
how E occurs, C is a cause of E.” 43 Another way to put it is to say that an
event c causes the event e if there is a “chain of influence” from c to e.
C. Probabilistic Approaches of Causation

05/10/2016 13:13:34

43. Paul, supra note 26, at 304.
44. Hitchcock, supra note 20; Jon Williamson, Probabilistic Theories, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION, supra note 3, at 318–59.
45. Williamson, supra, note 44, at 321–25. Proponents of probabilities theories of causality
include: HANS REICHENBACH, THE DIRECTION OF TIME (Maria Reichenbach ed., 1971); RICHARD E.
NEAPOLITAN, PROBABILISTIC REASONING IN EXPERT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND ALGORITHMS (1990);
JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING AND INFERENCE (2d ed. 2000); PATRICK SUPPES, A
PROBABILISTIC THEORY OF CAUSALITY (1970); I.J. Good, A Theory of Causality, 9 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI.
307 (1959); Hans Reichenbach, The Principle of Causality and the Possibility of its Empirical Confirmation, in MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 109 (Keegan Paul ed., 1959); Wesley C. Salmon, Probabilistic Causality, 61 PACIFIC PHIL. Q. 50 (1980).
46. Williamson, supra note 44, at 330.
47. Id. at 320.
48. Id. at 320–21.
49. Hitchcock, supra note 20, at 1.3.
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Probabilistic theories of causation44 are generally presented as a major
alternative to the regularity approach that are intended to draw the consequences of indeterminism. Hans Reichenbach 45 was the first author to provide a comprehensive epistemological account of causal relationships
based on probabilities. Nowadays, probabilistic theories of causality have
reached a wider audience and their expansion was accompanied by an increased mathematization of causality. 46 In the probabilistic approach, causes are seen as raising the probability of their effects. In other words, “(1)
changing a cause makes a difference to its effects, and (2) this differencemaking shows up in probabilistic dependencies between cause and effect.” 47 Many proponents of probabilistic theories maintain that “probabilistic dependencies characterize the causal relation, i.e. provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for causal connection, of the form: C causes E if
and only if appropriate probabilistic dependencies obtain.” 48
Probabilistic theories of causation interpret probabilities objectively,
which means that they see probabilities as expressing frequencies that are
objective features of the world, as opposed to subjective probabilities
which express the degree of an individual’s personal belief in the likelihood
of a causal link. These theories are sometimes presented as theories of singular causation relating specific events and sometimes referred to as theories of general causation relating types of events. 49
In the probabilistic account of general causation, the cause c raises the
probability of its effect e, which means that the probability that smokers
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develop lung cancer is higher than the probability of suffering from lung
cancer in general. It also means, in other words, that the probability, for a
smoker, of suffering from lung cancer, is higher than the probability, for a
non-smoker, of suffering from lung cancer.
Such approaches are compatible with imperfect regularities: A may
raise the probability of B even though A is not invariably followed by B.
Moreover, this approach is not threatened by the problem of heterogeneity
of circumstances. In other words, smoking is a cause of lung cancer, not
because all smokers develop lung cancer, but because smokers are more
likely to develop lung cancer than non-smokers. This is also consistent with
there being some smokers who avoid lung cancer, and some non-smokers
who die from lung cancer.
As other theories do, the probabilistic account faces counterexamples.
One counterexample is the case where an actual causal relationship established by our physical knowledge is not accompanied by the raising of
probabilities.50 Raising of probabilities is also absent in cases of causal
preemption. For example, Mr. X had a traffic accident resulting in a 60%
chance of death. However, Mr. X was already suffering from a fatal disease
that caused a 90% chance of death. Here, the actual cause preempted a
stronger cause, but it lowered the victim’s chance of death from 90% to
60%. Furthermore, it may happen that a given factor raises the probability
of an outcome without causing it. In view of those counterexamples, some
authors advocate a pluralistic account of causality according to which causal relationships are sometimes probabilistic and sometimes not. 51
II. MAIN APPROACHES OF CAUSATION IN LEGAL THINKING

A. Counterfactual Approach of Causation in the Law
The idea that a cause must be a condition that “made a difference” by
being necessary for the occurrence of the consequence, in the sense that
Williamson, supra note 44, at 339–44.
Id. at 342; See, e.g., Ned Hall, Two Concepts of Causation, in CAUSATION AND
COUNTERFACTUALS 225, 225–76 (John Collins et al. eds., 2004).

05/10/2016 13:13:34

50.
51.
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The prevailing approaches to the question of causation in the law appear to be directly inspired by philosophical thinking. This is why the classification used to present those theories will be roughly similar to the one
used in the first part of this article. However, the counterfactual approach
will be studied first, since it seems to have developed before the emergence
of the regularity and probabilistic views of causation.
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without it the consequence would not have occurred on the particular occasion, is widely shared in various legal systems. In common law countries, it
takes the form of the “but for test” while in civil law countries it underlies
the theory of the equivalence of conditions. In both common law and civil
law jurisdictions, the but for test is usually assumed to require a hypothetical counterfactual analysis.
1. The “But for Test” in Common Law Countries

05/10/2016 13:13:34

52. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 15, 16, 69, 110; See also Richard W. Wright, Causation
in Tort Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1775 (1985).
53. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 114–15.
54. Robert N. Strassfeld, If. . .: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 345
(1992).
55. Wright, supra note 52, at 1775–76.
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In common law countries, the causal relationship that must be established in order to make someone liable in negligence is typically described
as the “but for test”. 52 Although some commentators argue that the but for
test does not need to be applied as a hypothetical possible worlds analysis, 53 this test is often presented as expressing a relationship of counterfactual dependence. Whether described factually or counterfactually, under the
“but for” test, a defendant is a cause of the plaintiff’s harm if and only if,
had the defendant not acted tortiously (or negligently), the plaintiff would
not have been injured. 54 The but for test is deployed in most common law
jurisdictions and is used by courts and juries to determine what is called
“actual” or “factual” causation. Generally, other requirements are imposed
by the law, like the fact that the link between the defendant’s negligence
and the plaintiff ’s harm is direct or proximate.
The but for test is subject to difficulties already discussed which are
specific to counterfactual approaches. The test produces counterintuitive
results, especially in cases of causal overdetermination. 55 For example, in
duplicative causation situations, where two (or more) distinct causes joined
to cause the damage, but each of them was sufficient to produce it alone. In
those cases, neither factor can be treated as a but for cause given the existence of another factor which was sufficient to produce the harm. The same
issue is raised in alternative causation cases. In the classic example of two
defendants simultaneously shooting at and hitting the deceased with fatal
shots, the but for test yields the implausible conclusion that neither has
caused the harm.
These problems have led some commentators to suggest the abandonment of the but for test. Some of them have advanced a substantial-
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factor criterion under which the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the harm
if it is a “substantial factor” in producing that harm. 56 The substantial factor
criterion was adopted in the First and Second Restatement of Torts to encompass both but for causes and cases in which multiple “actively operating forces” were each independently sufficient (along with shared
“background” conditions) to produce the harm. 57 However, due to its question-begging nature, the Restatement (Third) of Torts has abandoned the
notion of “substantial factor” and now refers to the NESS criterion for cases of causal overdetermination in the comments to (but not the actual text)
of section 27, while providing in section 26 that “conduct is a factual cause
of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”
2. The Theory of the Equivalence of the Conditions in Civil Law
Countries

05/10/2016 13:13:34

56. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 234–35 (1930); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE (1927).
57. “if two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s negligence, the other not
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the
actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
58. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 431.
59. M VON BÜRI, DIE KAUSALITÄT UND IHRE STRAFRECHTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN (Stuttgart
1885).
60. FRANZ VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS (13th ed. 1903).

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A

The theory of the equivalence of the conditions stems from both the
empiricist tradition of Hume and Mill and the further reflection of German
authors. 58 Indeed, since there was little theoretical reflection on causation
in French doctrinal writing during the period immediately following the
adoption of the Civil Code, it was only through the influence of German
literature that, during the latter part of nineteenth century, French commentators gained exposure to theories of causation.
The starting point of the theory of the equivalence of the conditions is
the classic observation that a fully described causal law lists all the conditions that together are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of a certain consequence. According to the German theorist Maximilian von
Büri, 59 since it is impossible to specify the exact share of each condition in
the production of the result, every factor should be considered as a cause.
Von Büri justified this assertion by the fact that the ultimate result is indivisible. Franz von Liszt 60 also believed that, since all conditions are necessary to produce the result, they are, therefore, inevitably equivalent.
Therefore, according to the theory of the equivalence of the conditions,
every condition of an injury can be considered a cause. In this respect, the
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61. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 142, 185.
62. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 14, 1970, Bull. crim.
1970, No. 23; RTD civ. 1970, 574 obs. G. Durry (Fr.).
63. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Oct. 5, 2004, D. inf. rap.
2972. Contra Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 15, 1958 JCP G
1959, II, 11026, note P. Esmein (Fr.).
64. Draft Décret du 2008, Avant-Projet de Réforme Due Droit Des Obligations Et Du Droit De
La Prescription, DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE (P. Catala ed., 2006). See also Proposals for Reform of
the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription, MINISTÉRE DE LA JUSTICE (John Cartwright &
Simon Whittaker trans., 2007), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf
[hereinafter Oxford Translation] (English version); HENRI CAPITANT ASSOC., AVANT-PROJET DE
REFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS (ARTICLES 1101 À 1386 DU CODE CIVIL) ET DU DROIT DE LA
PRESCRIPTION (ARTICLES 2234 À 2281 DU CODE CIVIL) (2008),
http://www.henricapitant.org/node/73 [hereinafter Capitant Translation].
65. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE (F. Terré
ed., 2011).
66. See Oliver Moréteau, France: French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization, 6 J.
CIV. L. STUD., 760, 769 (2013).
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theory of the equivalence of the conditions is often thought to lead to the
classic counterfactual approach to causation. Another way to state the theory is to say that, since all the conditions are equivalent, every condition
without which the effect would not have occurred is considered a cause.
Causation is thus established through a test of counterfactual dependence
that is roughly analogous to the but for test.
The theory of the equivalence of the conditions has been criticized in
French commentary for not offering any method to select the cause among
the conditions that have combined to produce the damage. 61 It is often
highlighted that the test is over-inclusive. For example, where victims have
been injured in accidents and transported to the hospital, and subsequently
harmed due to medical malpractice,62 the French courts tend to link the
victim’s ultimate harm to the initial accident, namely, the driver’s negligent
act. 63 But this criticism probably confuses the issue of causation with the
distinct issue of legal responsibility.
Although the theory of the equivalence of the conditions has an unquestionable influence on case law, it cannot be asserted that this theory
has been consecrated in the French positive law, which does not seem to
choose one approach over another. This is probably why the reform projects of French Tort Law, the Catala Draft, 64 made no attempt to formulate
a definition of causation (Article 1347 of the French Civil Code). The other
project, the Terré Draft, 65 states that the cause is any fact without which the
damage would not have occurred while also specifying that such a fact
must be susceptible of producing the damage “according to the ordinary
course of things” (Article 10).66 Generally, civil law scholars and courts
use the but for criterion for factual causation, although with various modi-
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fications in specific cases. Ingeborg Puppe has detailed the inadequacies of
this approach and argued for the need to instead adopt a Millian covering
law analysis. 67
B. Causation Theories Based on the Covering Law Analysis
Legal theorists have been strongly influenced by Mill’s covering law
analysis of causal laws and singular instances of causation. According to
this approach, a fully described causal law lists all the conditions that together are necessary and sufficient, when fully instantiated on a specific
occasion, for the occurrence of a certain consequence. This perspective is
echoed in legal approaches to causal relationships in civil law countries and
common law systems.
1. The Covering Law Perspective in Civil Law Countries

05/10/2016 13:13:34

67. See, e.g., Ingeborg Puppe, Der Erfolg und seine kausale Erklärung im Strafrecht, 92
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 863 (1980); Ingeborg Puppe, The Concept of Causation in the Law, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY” 67 (Benedikt Kahmen & Markus Stepanians eds., 2013).
68. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶ 80.
69. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 465.
70. L. VON BAR, DIE LEHRE VOM KAUSALZUSAMMENHANGE IM RECHTE, BESONDERS IM
STRAFRECHTE (1871).
71. Id. at 14 (cited by HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 466).
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In civil law countries, the covering law analysis underlies not only the
“equivalence of conditions” approach to factual causation, but also, by its
reliance on causal (natural) laws, the theory of adequate causation. The
theory of adequate causation was developed by German authors in the end
of the nineteenth century 68 as a theory of appropriate legal responsibility.
The adequacy theory belongs to the “generalizing theories” insofar as
it selects “a particular condition as the cause of an event because it is of a
kind which is connected with such events by a generalization or statement
of regular sequence.” 69 Carl Ludwig von Bar was the first scholar to develop an account of the adequacy theory. 70 For him, the determining cause of
an ultimate event is the human action that altered the usual or ordinary
course of events. “A man is in the legal sense the cause of an occurrence to
the extent that he may be regarded as the condition by virtue of which what
would be otherwise regarded as the regular course of events in human experience is altered.” 71 This first account of the theory defines the adequate
cause as an event that departs from the ordinary or regular course of events.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 44 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

04 G'SELL (DO NOT DELETE)

516

4/14/2016 7:26 PM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 91:2

Subsequently, other commentators like Ludwig Träger 72 expressed the
view that a condition is an adequate cause of a consequence if it tends to be
followed by the result in question according to human experience and in
the ordinary course of things. Träger’s formulation is still used in French
treatises and manuals to define adequate causation. French authors consider
that a condition is an adequate cause when it is likely to produce the effect
according to the ordinary course of things and in light of the experience of
everyday occurrences.73 It is also said that necessary antecedents can be
described as adequate causes if they normally produce the harm, as opposed to mere occasions that have been followed by the result because of
unforeseen and exceptional circumstances. 74 That being said, the most sophisticated versions of the adequacy theory, although they are undoubtedly
based on causal generalizations, appear to be closer to the probabilistic
approaches of causation presented above.
2.. The Covering Law Perspective in Common Law Systems

05/10/2016 13:13:34

72. LUDWIG TRÄGER, DER KAUSALBEGRIFFE IM STRAF- UND ZIVILRECHT (1904); Duncan
Fairgrieve & Florence G’Sell, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CAUSATION 111, 118 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
73. PHILIPPE BRUN, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE ¶ 227 (3e ed. 2014);
MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN, 1 DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET QUASI-CONTRATS
(3e ed. 2013); PHILIPPE MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 92 (L.G.D.J. ed., 7e ed. 2015);
FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS ¶ 860 (11e ed. 2013); PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU,
DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET DES CONTRATS. REGIMES D’INDEMNISATION 2014-2015 ¶ 1716 (10e
ed. 2014).
74. JEAN-LUC AUBERT ET AL., 2 LES OBLIGATIONS, LE FAIT JURIDIQUE ¶ 158 (13th ed. 2009).
75. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 113.
78. Id. at 112.
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In common law systems, the most widely accepted theories of causation derive from the Millian covering law model. That is the case with the
approach developed by Hart and Honoré, which was adopted but restricted
by John Mackie (INUS) and modified and extended by Richard Wright
(NESS).
In 1959, Hart and Honoré published their seminal study Causation in
the Law. 75 The aim of their study was to examine how causal language was
used in the law. They considered that law was concerned with “the plain
man’s notions of causation”, i.e. the “common sense notion” of causation. 76
Among the various notions they found, one was the concept of a “causally
relevant factor” 77 that is “necessary just in the sense that it is one of a set of
conditions jointly sufficient for the production of the consequence.”78 In
this respect, Hart and Honoré’s notion of a “causally relevant condi-
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79. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 124
80. Id. at 123.
81. MACKIE, supra note 27.
82. Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 110.
83. Wright, supra note 52; Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001); Richard W.
Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003).
84. Wright, supra note 52, at 1774.
85. Id. at 1806–07; see also Wright, The Grounds and Extent, supra note 83, at 1445 n. 67.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 45 Side A

tion” clearly relied on Mill’s idea that a fully described causal law lists all
the conditions that together are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence
of a certain consequence. The definition they gave is considered as “a major advance in the analysis of causation, in both law and philosophy.” 79 It
expressed the view that, in a specific situation, a causally relevant condition
is a necessary element of a set of conditions jointly and minimally sufficient for the harmful outcome. In their account, necessity is described in its
weakest sense: it merely requires that a condition be necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence
of the effect, rather than being always necessary (strict necessity) or necessary for the effect in the singular instance (strong necessity). 80
In 1965, Mackie published a well known analysis of Hart and
Honoré’s contribution. 81 He employed an acronym, INUS (for ‘insufficient
but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition’), to describe
the elements of a causal law, but, unlike Hart and Honoré, he adhered to the
but for test in singular instances of causation. 82
In 1985, Wright 83 substantially revised and extended Hart and
Honoré’s account of a causally relevant factor and used another acronym,
NESS (for ‘Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set’), preferring its formulation to the “INUS” suggested by Mackie. According to Wright, “a particular condition was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a
necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.” 84 As Puppe also insists, the
NESS test is not presented as requiring a “counterfactual” analysis. Both
Wright and Puppe insist that speculating on what might have happened in a
hypothetical world where the specified factor is absent is unnecessary. 85 It
is only necessary to consider what has actually happened.
It is generally accepted in academic doctrines in common law jurisdictions and by the courts in those jurisdictions which have been exposed to
and understand the NESS account, that it is appropriate to use the NESS
criterion when the but for test fails, as the more comprehensive test for
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causation in its purely factual, scientific sense.86 This test has been adopted
in the comments to sections 26 and 27 of the Restatement Third of Torts for
cases of causal overdetermination, 87 which the NESS analysis, unlike the
but for analysis, is precisely able to handle. In the common example of two
persons who each simultaneously fire fatal shots at the deceased victim,
each of the shots is a NESS causal condition because each is part of a complete instantiation of a causal law that links shooting with dying. The same
reasoning applies to preemption cases, for example in the case where Mr. X
died in a car accident while suffering from a serious disease that would
have led him to death anyway.
While the NESS theory is generally accepted by academics and the
few courts that have considered it as the most comprehensive test for causation, its creator claims that NESS is “the meaning of causation”. 88 This
claim has opened the door for criticism, 89 particularly because the NESS
test is dependent on external causal laws. 90 Richard Fumerton and Ken
Kress have highlighted the fact that the NESS test presupposes determinism 91 and questioned both the utility of the concept 92 and its ability to solve
overdetermination cases. 93 Above all, they pointed out what they call a
“vicious conceptual circularity” 94 since the NESS test depends on external
causal laws. They reached the conclusion that the concept of NESS cannot
express the very meaning of causation. 95 Nevertheless, many commentators
agree that the NESS test has practical value and can serve as a device to
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05/10/2016 13:13:34

86. Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1256; Wright & Puppe, supra note 24, at 130–31.
87. “If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the
physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause
of the harm.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 27 (AM. LAW. INST. 2005).
88. Wright, supra note 52, at 1802.
89. Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and
Causal Sufficiency, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (2001); Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean
by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433 (2008).
90. In Wright’s own terms, “causal law is a law of nature, it describes an empirically based,
invariable, nonprobabilistic relation between some minimal set of abstractly described antecedent
conditions and some abstractly described consequent condition, such that the concrete instantiation of
all the antecedent conditions will always immediately result in the concrete instantiation of the consequent condition. Any concrete condition that is part of the instantiation of the completely instantiated
antecedent of the causal law is a cause of (contributed to) the instantiation of the consequent.” Richard
W. Wright, Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 72,
at 91, http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/709.
91. Fumerton & Kress, supra note 89, at 97.
92. Id. at 98–99.
93. Id. at 100.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Richard Wright replied to those criticisms in Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of
Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 72, at 285.
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determine whether a specified factor was involved in the occurrence of the
damage. 96
In recent years, some jurists, although influenced by the NESS theory,
have preferred intuitive approaches which employ notions of “involvement” (Jane Stapleton) or “substantial contribution” (Michael Moore). 97
The notion of “involvement” is promoted by Stapleton as expressing the
most convenient choice for the law when dealing with causal language.
According to Stapleton, it is necessary to make “a choice of underlying
interrogation (blame, explanation, physical role, any sort of involvement
etc.)” 98 so that it is clear what information lawyers are reporting when they
use causal language for legal purposes.99 In this perspective, it is the notion
of “involvement” that is appropriate. Such a notion “identifies that there is
a contrast between the actual world and some hypothetical world from
which we exclude (at least)” a specified factor,100 which expresses that
“while in the former world the phenomenon exists, in the latter it does
not.” 101 “Involvement” must be determined by “objective data (our
knowledge of the physical laws of nature, evidence of behaviour, and so
on)” and is thus untainted by normative issues.102 In this respect, the notion
of involvement relies on a relationship of necessity and is therefore, to a
certain extent, a version of the counterfactual approach. However, Stapleton’s concept of “involvement” is also closely related to Hart and Honoré’s
notion of a “causally relevant condition.” 103 This is why Stapleton admits
that the NESS test appears to be very convenient for identifying the relationships of involvement, even though she denies that NESS could express
the real meaning of causation in the law. 104

Probabilistic approaches to causation, which are especially popular
among efficiency theorists, have influenced legal scholars willing to take
into account the fact that causal generalizations generally describe what
usually or often happens rather than what always happens. Probabilities are

Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1256.
Moore, supra note 25 passim.
Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1223–24; Stapleton, supra note 89, at 439.
Stapleton, supra note 89, at 439.
Stapleton, supra note 6, at 1217.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1240–41.
Id. at 1228–29.
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C. Probabilistic Causation in the Law
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also used in the law of evidence, in order to express the various degrees of
uncertainty affecting causal relations.
1. The Probabilistic Analysis of Legal Causation

J. VON KRIES, VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE 12 (1882).
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 36, at 469.
G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 142, 185.
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Philosophically speaking, the probabilistic theories of causation were
developed in order to take into account the fact that causal laws as we
know them generally are actually indeterministic. Every smoker does not
suffer from lung cancer but a smoker has an increased probability of developing lung cancer in comparison with a non-smoker. In this respect, probabilistic theories are mainly theories of causal relations between types of
events: they express general causal relationships in a world where causal
laws are mostly indeterministic. Yet, the probabilistic approach may also
be extended to cover causal relationships between particular events. For
example, it may be asserted that Mr. Gourlain being a smoker raised the
probability of his suffering from lung cancer. Then it arguably may be concluded that Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer is due to his smoking. Both aspects
of the probabilistic approach can be found in the law of torts.
For instance, in civil law countries, the adequacy theory (which, however, is a theory of legal responsibility for actually caused consequences) is
often presented in probabilistic terms. According to Johannes von Kries, 105
who expanded von Bar’s theory, a given fact can be considered to be the
adequate cause of the damage if and only if it has significantly increased
the objective probability of occurrence of the damage. 106 This test of objective probability thereby allows one to distinguish an adequate cause from
only incidental or accidental factors contributing to the injury. Träger also
highlighted that a condition may be considered as an adequate cause of a
consequence if it has increased significantly the degree of probability of
harm. The theory involves linking concrete facts to general causal connections in order to assess the likelihood of damage in the absence/presence of
the factor considered. Within this framework, the adequacy theory is able
to establish a hierarchy between different factors based on the increased
probability of the outcome. The factor that increased the probability of
damage by, say, 30% (all other things being equal) is more “adequate” than
the factor which increased the probability of such an outcome by only 15%.
Nevertheless, the idea of probability is rarely mentioned in France. For
most French lawyers, a factor is an adequate cause when it usually produces the effect by the normal course of things. 107
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108. Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 644, 644–52 (Bouckaert & G. Degeest eds., 2000), reprinted with updates in TORT LAW
AND ECONOMICS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 83–108 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009);
see also Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985).
109. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 (1983); see also WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 228–55 (1987).
110. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975).
111. Ben-Shahar, supra note 108, at 646–47. See also Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation
and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 468 (1980).
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In common law countries, the probabilistic approach of legal causation is mainly advocated by legal economists. 108 Indeed, the probabilistic
account appears indispensable to the efficiency theory of tort law which
defines the primary objective of civil liability as minimizing accident costs.
In this perspective, the party that could prevent the accident with a lower
cost than the expected harm arising from the accident should be held liable. 109 In the absence of transaction costs, if the expected harm exceeds the
cost of preventing it, those who can be expected to suffer from the accident
will conclude an agreement with the one who can avoid the damage at the
lowest cost in order to avoid the accident. In the presence of transaction
costs, it is for the law to make the “cheapest cost avoider” pay for the accident. In other words, it is the “cheapest cost avoider” of the injury that
should be considered as having caused the injury. Within this context, Guido Calabresi 110 distinguished the but for test from a probabilistic test that
he called “causal link”: an act is causally linked to an injury if it increases
the probability of its occurrence. This probabilistic linkage concept, sometimes called “ prospective causation” because it is forward-looking, 111 is
presented by legal economists as an alternative notion of causation that
should be adopted in order to identify the “cheapest cost avoider”. Therefore, it is the probabilistic approach of causation, which is embodied in
Judge Learned Hand’s formula, that should be used in tort law.
To sum up, in the probabilistic perspective, a condition is a cause of
some result if it increased the probability that the result would occur. This
probabilistic increased-risk concept uses ex ante causal probabilities that
are abstract and independent of the particularistic evidence specific to a
particular occasion. This use of ex ante probabilities can be criticized on
the grounds that ex ante causal probabilities are better suited for causal
prediction of what might happen than for causal explanation of what actually happened. In order to explain what happened and to determine liability,
it seems more appropriate to rely on probabilities expressing the most like-
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ly causal chain, or, in other words, a certain degree of belief. In this respect,
probabilities appear to be better suited for solving evidence issues than for
defining the very notion of causation.
2. Probabilities in the Law of Evidence

Wright, supra note 90, at 93.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 88, ¶ 30.
Id. at 93–94.
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115.
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Although we have so far dealt with objective probabilities that express
the likelihood of a specific occurrence, another kind of probability may be
used in the law of evidence in order to formulate a certain degree of belief.
Such subjective probabilities are not intended to render the frequency of a
given phenomenon but to reflect a state of belief or a certain degree of
(un)certainty. “Ex post probabilities“112 may be established, after the effect
occurred, in order to express a judgment on what actually happened on a
particular occasion. For example, there may be a 75% probability that the
statement “Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer resulted from his smoking” is true.
In common law systems, the law of evidence uses a “standard of persuasion,” 113 which is usually referred to as the “balance of probability” or,
in the United States, the “preponderance of the evidence”. Most scholars
and courts interpret the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as meaning “more likely than not” or “more probably true than not”. 114 Especially
with the first interpretation, it is often thought that the standard requires
using a probabilistic test that requires a greater than fifty percent probability that the facts at issue are true. For example, since it must be established
that it is more probable than not that Mr. Gourlain’s lung cancer is due to
his smoking, there should be a greater than 50% probability that smoking
caused his disease. However, it has been argued that the probability does
not refer to a mere aggregate class-based frequency but rather to some minimal level of belief which is founded on the concrete evidence specific to
the situation provided by the parties and the court’s general knowledge. 115
In a civil law country like France, the use of probabilities does not appear as natural as it is in common law systems. In French Law, causation is
considered as a legal fact (“fait juridique”) that can be proved by all means
(“par tous moyens”). In most cases, courts use presumptive evidence provided for by Article 1349 of the Civil Code that defines presumptions as
“the consequences that a statute or the court draws from a known fact to an
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unknown fact.” 116 Specifically, Article 1353 of the Civil Code provides that
presumptions “are left to the insight and carefulness of the judges, who
shall only admit serious, precise, and concurrent presumptions.” 117 Since
the standard of proof is provided for by a legal provision, the Cour de cassation controls the arguments used by judges to justify the admission or
rejection of a causal link. In the Hepatitis B vaccine litigation, the Cour de
cassation has thus recognized that the alleged causal relationship between
the vaccine and the outbreak of multiple sclerosis could be established by
serious, precise and concurrent presumptions, 118 which is also accepted by
the Conseil d’Etat. 119 Thus, it was found that the short delay between the
injection of the vaccine and the appearance of the symptoms of the disease
as well as the lack of any predisposing factor were sufficient grounds to
admit the existence of a causal relationship, despite the scientific uncertainty. Very recently, the Cour de cassation has decided to submit a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice. The question dealt with the
compatibility of such a method of proof with Article 4 of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, reg-
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116. “Des conséquences que la loi ou le magistrat tire d’un fait connu à un fait inconnu.” CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1349 (Fr.).
117. “Sont abandonnées aux lumières et à la prudence du magistrat, qui ne doit admettre que des
présomptions graves, précises et concordantes.” CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1353 (Fr.).
118. Cour de cassation (Cass.) [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 22, 2008, Bull civ.
I, No. 06-10-967, Recueil-Dalloz [D.] 2008 A.J. 1544 obs. I. Gallmeister (Fr.) and 2894, obs. P. Brun &
P. Jourdain; RDSS 2008. 578, obs. J. Peigné; Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (RTD civ.) 2008. 492,
obs. P. Jourdain; Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial (RTD com.) 2009. 200, obs. B. Bouloc; JCP
2008, II, 10131, note Grynbaum, JCP I 186, No. 3, obs. Stoffel-Munck; Revue des contrats [RDC]
2008. 1186, obs. J.S. Borghetti; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ.,
Jan. 22, 2009, No. 07-16.449, D. 2009, 429; Revue de Droit Sanitaire et Social (RDSS) 2009 367, obs.
J. Peigné; RTD civ. 2009. 329, obs. P. Jourdain; RCA 2009, No. 58, note Radé; RDC 2009. 1028, note
Deshayes; Sept. 24, 2009, No. 08-16.097, D. 2009. 2426, obs. I. Gallmeister; RTD com. 2010. 414, obs.
B. Bouloc; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 25, 2010, No.
09-16.556; D. 2010. 2909, obs. I. Gallmeister; D. 2011. 316, chron. P. Brun, D. 2565, obs. A. Laude,
D. 2891, obs. P. Delebecque, J.-D. Bretzner et I. Gelbard-Le Dauphin; RDSS 2011. 164, obs. J. Peigné;
RTD civ. 2011. 134, obs. P. Jourdain; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re
civ., May, 29 2013, No. 12-20.903, D. 2013. 1717, obs. I. Gallmeister, note J.- S. Borghetti, D. 1723,
note P. Brun, D. 2014. 47, obs. P. Brun and O. Gout; RTD civ. 2013. 625, obs. P. Jourdain; RTD com.
2013. 797, obs. B. Bouloc; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ., July
10, 2013, No. 12-21.314, Dalloz actualité, July 25, 2013, obs. T. Douville; D. 2013. 2311 and 2306,
avis C. Mellottée and 2312, note P. Brun and 2315, note J.-S. Borghetti, D. 2014. 47, obs. P. Brun and
O. Gout D. 563, chron. C. Capitaine et I. Darret-Courgeon, D. 2021, obs. A. Laude; RDSS 2013. 938,
obs. J. Peigné; RTD civ. 2013. 852, obs. P. Jourdain; RCA 2013. et 6, Bakouche; JCP 2013, No. 1012,
note Parance.
119. Conseil d’Etat (CE) Mar. 9, 2007, No. 267635 (Schwartz); AJDA 2007. 861, concl. T. Olson;
D. 2007. 2204, obs. E. Pahlawan-Sentilhes, note L. Neyret; D. 2897, obs. P. Brun et P. Jourdain; RDSS
2007. 543, obs. D. Cristol; Mar. 9, 2007, No. 278665 (Commune de Grenoble); AJDA 2007. 861, concl.
T. Olson; RDSS 2007. 543, obs. D. Cristol; Conseil d’Etat (CE) Mar. 9, 2007, No. 285288 (Thomas);
AJDA 2007. 861, concl. T. Olson; JCP 2007 II 10142, note Laude; July 24, 2009, No. 308876; AJDA
2009. 1466; RDSS 2009. 962, obs. D. Cristol; JCP 2009, No. 223, obs. M.C.R.; RDC 2010. 79, obs.
Borghetti; RDSS 2009. 962, obs. Cristol.
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ulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
liability for defective products. 120
While the French standard is not, as such, probabilistic, French courts
use probabilistic reasoning in order to compensate the uncertainty of causal
judgments. For instance, the concept of loss of chance is widely used,121
especially in medical malpractice cases. 122 That being said, probabilities
could also be used beyond the well-known use of the concept of loss of
chance in order to compensate for a lack of evidence, for example in multiple-exposure cases (asbestos and cigarette-smoking cases) or in alternativecausation cases (DES cases). The idea is to impose liability for a proportionate share of the injury, based on each defendant’s contribution to the
total risk that led to the injury. In the DES litigation, the Cour de cassation
has decided to reverse the burden of proof for the benefit of victims 123 in
cases where the defendant could not be specifically identified because two
different pharmaceutical companies had marketed the DES. Therefore, if
the victim proves that his/her injury results from exposure to DES, then
he/she can be compensated by every DES manufacturer or even by all DES
manufacturers, jointly and severally (responsibility in solidum). Then the
manufacturer who compensated the victim can exercise a recourse action
against the other manufacturers. In the DES litigation, the Cour d’appel de
Paris has decided that the burden of compensating the victims should be
spread equally among the jointly liable producers, despite the fact that both
producers had significantly different market shares.124 However, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre has, on the contrary, ruled that each
producer’s contribution should be determined in proportion to their respec37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 48 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

120. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 12, 2015, 1418118.
121. G’SELL-MACREZ, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 455–57; See also J. Boré, L’indemnisation pour les
chances perdues, une forme d’appréciation quantitative de la causalité d’un fait dommageable, JCP G.
1974, I, 2620; G. Mémeteau, Perte de chances et responsabilité médicale, Gaz. Pal. 1997, 2, 1367 (Fr.).
122. In a seminal case, a doctor had committed an error of diagnosis on a child who remained
crippled. The judges condemned the doctor to pay damages for the loss of “chances of cure”. Cour de
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ., Dec. 14, 1965, JCP G. 1966, II, 14753,
note R. Savatier (Fr.); See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1re civ.,
Jan. 27, 1970, 31, Bull. civ. I No. 37, JCP G. 1970, II, 16422, note Rabut G. (Fr.); VINEY & P.
JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, SOUS LA DIRECTION DE JACQUES GHESTIN, LES CONDITIONS DE LAT
RESPONSABILITÉ ¶ 370 (2e ed. 1999).
123. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1 re civ., Sept. 24 , 2009, No.
08-10.081 and No. 08-16.305, D. 2009. AJ 2342, obs. Gallmeister; D. 2010. Pan. 49, obs. Brun; JCP G.
2009. 304 obs. Mistretta; JCP G. 383, note Hocquet-Berg; RLDC 2009/65, No. 3605, obs. Bugnicourt;
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme Court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 28, 2010, 08-18837 (Fr.).
124. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, pôle 2, 2e ch., Oct. 26, 2012, No.
10/18297: D. 2012, 2859, note C. Quétand-Finet. See S. Ferey et F. G’sell, Pour une prise en compte
des parts de marché dans la détermination de la contribution à la dette de réparation. A propos de l’arrêt
CA Paris, Oct. 26, 2012, D. 2013, 2709.
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tive market shares. 125 There is currently an intense debate on the subject in
the French commentary. 126
Finally, it cannot be said that French jurists have never developed
sophisticated approaches of the concept of causation in the law of civil
liability. They have rather used the theories elaborated by German authors
in order to promote pragmatic solutions. It is on this basis that French
courts are now developing appropriate responses to the difficult issues
posed by the need to prove the causal link with sufficient certainty.
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125. Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] Nanterre, 2e ch., Apr. 10, 2014, No. 12/12349 and
12/13064; Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] Nanterre, May 22, 2014, No. 12/12339: JCP G. 2014, 678,
note J. Dubarry; D. 2014, 1434, obs. J.-S. Borghetti.
126. N. Molfessis, Du critère des parts de marché comme prétendu remède à l’incertitude sur
l’origine d’un dommage, LES PETITES AFFICHES, Oct. 15, 2015, at 7.

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B

05/10/2016 13:13:34

37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 49 Side B
05/10/2016 13:13:34

